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An Assessment of the Effectiveness of 
the Monetary Dialogue on the ECB’s 
Accountability and Transparency: 
A Qualitative Approach
The European Central Bank has been seen by some observers 
as lacking transparency and accountability. The following article examines whether the 
monetary dialogue between the European Pariliament’s Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) inﬂ  uences the ECB’s behaviour in this regard. 
This is done by comparing the issues raised by the ECON 
and its panel of experts and the changes in the
 ECB’s procedures and arrangements.
 In the euro area, the European Parliament has the 
task of holding the European Central Bank (ECB) to 
account. In this paper we take a closer look at the 
most important part of the relation between the ECB 
and the European Parliament, namely the quarterly 
monetary dialogues between the Committee on Eco-
nomic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) and the ECB. 
We investigate whether this monetary dialogue inﬂ  u-
ences the ECB’s transparency, communication policy 
and accountability by comparing the issues raised by 
the ECON and its panel of experts and the changes 
in the ECB’s procedures and arrangements. In this 
paper we approach this subject qualitatively. 
Based on our results we conclude that the ECB 
is highly responsive to the ECON. Its response can 
be divided into two parts. We distinguish between 
immediate response (comments by the President of 
the ECB during the monetary dialogue) and delayed 
response (the degree to which the ECB incorporates 
points raised during the dialogue in its policy). 
This paper provides a short background on the 
monetary dialogue between the ECB and the Euro-
pean Parliament. We then describe the methodology 
and the data used and look into the contribution of 
the panel of experts and the monetary dialogue itself. 
To complete the analysis, we have sifted through all 
the ECB’s press conferences and press releases to 
make a list of changes at the ECB. Finally, we com-
pare these lists and present some conclusions.
The Background of the Monetary Dialogue
Besides the fact that the Treaty on European Un-
ion1 gave the ECB a very high degree of independ-
ence, it also contained provisions regarding the 
issues of transparency and accountability. According 
to Article 113 (3) of the Treaty and Article 15.3 of the 
ESCB Statute, the President of the ECB is required to 
present an annual report to the European Parliament. 
The same articles go on to state that, “the President 
of the ECB and the other members of the Executive 
Board may, at the request of the European Parliament 
or on their own initiative, be heard by the competent 
Committees of the European Parliament”. 
Based on these requirements it was agreed that 
the President of the ECB would appear four times a 
year before the ECON. Each session of the monetary 
dialogue starts with the statement from the President 
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of the ECB explaining in detail the central bank’s as-
sessment of economic and monetary developments 
at the time. After this introduction the 42 members 
of the ECON have the opportunity to ask their ques-
tions. Usually these sessions last approximately two 
hours. Shortly after they have taken place, verbatim 
transcripts of these sessions are published on the 
ECON’s internet site.
Methodology and Data
Doing research on this or a similar subject involves 
certain difﬁ  culties, as the data used are not quantita-
tive but qualitative in nature. In order to be able to 
present a list of subjects mentioned in the monetary 
dialogue certain steps were followed. First, we con-
structed a framework to be able to determine when 
the mention of a subject had to be included in the 
aforementioned list. One possibility was to include 
only those subjects where it has been clearly sug-
gested that the ECB should take action with regard 
to the subject in question. This approach has two 
signiﬁ  cant negative side-effects however. First, it is 
necessary that there be an explicit, ofﬁ  cial sugges-
tion, such as a resolution. Second, this approach 
would not account for the frequency with which each 
subject was mentioned. With regard to the former, it 
is very well possible that the words used imply that a 
suggestion is being made but this would have to be 
left out because an explicit suggestion, such as a res-
olution or a bill is absent.2 To control for this handicap 
one could decide to include those implicit sugges-
tions, but then another difﬁ  culty would immediately 
prop up: it would be a highly subjective choice what 
to include and what to exclude. Furthermore, as this 
choice would have to be made on a case-by-case 
basis, the probability is high that it would either, unin-
tentionally, be inconsistent or would be perceived as 
such. In turn, as subjectivity would only be increased 
and a certain “choice-bias” would emerge, this pro-
cedure clearly would not satisfy the desire to make 
the process of the analysis as clear and as transpar-
ent as possible. Therefore we opted for the second 
option, namely to include those subjects mentioned 
(instead of suggested) by members of the ECON in 
the monetary dialogue. 
The next step is to make a clear distinction be-
tween subjects related to transparency and account-
ability, and those related to other tasks of the ESCB.3 
In selecting what subjects are to be included in this 
paper we used the following rule: only those subjects 
that would cause profound changes in the transpar-
ency or accountability of the ECB have been se-
lected. Profound changes are deﬁ  ned as potentially 
forming a breach in the policy of the ECB in those 
areas. The criteria we used for deﬁ  ning subjects af-
fecting transparency and accountability, and includ-
ing them in the analysis, are as follows:4 
• formal objectives of monetary policy (goals as de-
ﬁ  ned in the Maastricht Treaty) and the deﬁ  nition of 
price stability
•  the explanation of how information is used and 
analysed for monetary policy purposes (e.g. pub-
lication of macroeconomic models and forecasts, 
minutes of the meetings)
• the stability oriented monetary policy strategy and 
the openness regarding it 
• accountability with regard to the target. 
We have designed this framework, with its rules, 
deﬁ  nitions and procedures, in order to eliminate sub-
jectivity as far as possible.  
The data needed to construct the list of subjects 
mentioned by the panel of experts was obtained 
from the brieﬁ  ng papers provided to the ECON. For 
the list of subjects mentioned during the monetary 
dialogues we have used the verbatim transcripts of 
each session, with the exception of the 17 April 2000 
session, of which the transcripts are not available. In 
total 20 sessions were considered. Both the papers 
by the experts and the verbatim transcripts of the 
monetary dialogue sessions can be found on the 
ECON internet site at europarl.eu.int/comparl/econ/
emu/default_en.htm.
To determine what changes the ECB implemented 
until December 2003, we have used the ECB’s press 
releases starting from 1 January 1999 up to 31 De-
cember 2003. These can be found on the ECB’s 
internet site at ecb.int, under “press releases”. In 
addition, we have used the ECB’s statements and 
transcripts of those press conferences related to 
monetary policy actions up to 31 December 2003. 
Press conferences that have taken place on 6 March, 
2 The European Parliament does not have the authority to change the 
ECB Statute. This probably explains why the resolutions are infre-
quent. Moreover, due to this fact bills are, by default, non- existent.
3 These other tasks are: to conduct foreign exchange operations 
consistent with the provisions of Article 111 (ex Article 109) of the 
Maastricht Treaty; to hold and manage the ofﬁ  cial foreign reserves of 
the member states and to promote the smooth operation of payment 
systems (European Central Bank: The Monetary Policy of the ECB, 
Frankfurt 2004).
4 These criteria were constructed using S. C. W. Eijffinger, P . M. 
Geraats: How Transparent are Central Banks?, CEPR Discussion 
Paper, No. 3188, 2002.ECB
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30 August and 13 December 2001 and 3 January 
2002 have not been used, as they concerned various 
issues other than monetary policy. The statements 
and transcripts can also be found on the ECB’s inter-
net site, under “calendars and events”. 
Subjects Raised by the Panel of Experts
 and the ECON
After the analysis of the brieﬁ  ng papers provided to 
the ECON by the panel of experts we have been able 
to put together a list of subjects that have frequently 
received attention (see Table 1). We have used the 
same criteria as reported above for this purpose.
With regard to the subjects mentioned by the panel 
of experts, it should be noted that, while the panel 
of experts strongly criticises the ECB on a number 
of issues, most of the panel members also highly 
praise its monetary policy actions. It is also interest-
ing to note that not only the panel members have this 
view, but also some of the ECON members (see for 
instance comments made by members Agag Longo, 
Von Wogau and Goebbels during the November 2001 
monetary dialogue). It can be stated that the way the 
policy actions were taken and communicated to the 
outside world have been criticised, but not the ac-
tions themselves. 
Using the transcripts of the question-and-answer 
sessions we constructed a similar list for subjects 
raised by the ECON (see Table 2).
Some points have to be made here with regard to 
Table 2. The  accountability criterion  does not include 
comments on the weak exchange rate of the euro. Al-
though this point was mentioned very regularly, it is 
not possible to hold the ECB accountable for it. The 
reason is that the ECB does not have an exchange-
rate target. Furthermore, comments regarding the 
secondary objective as deﬁ  ned in Article 105 of the 
Maastricht Treaty were included in the second crite-
rion. The reason is similar to the one with regard to 
the exchange rate. The ECB has price stability as its 
primary goal. Therefore, in order to assess the ECB’s 
performance on its secondary objective it is impera-
tive that it fulﬁ  ls the ﬁ  rst one over the medium term. 
Despite the fact that the ECB has not clearly deﬁ  ned 
what it means by “medium term”, it can safely be as-
sumed that it should not be measured in months but 
rather in years.5 A strong case can be made for the 
argument that the ECB cannot be held accountable 
for developments in inﬂ  ation in the ﬁ  rst two years of 
its existence. This follows from the fact that monetary 
policy is inevitably linked with long and variable lags. 
Therefore, the ECB’s monetary policy actions kick in 
only after a certain period, generally accepted to last 
somewhere around two years.
 The ECON seems to have understood  this. We 
would say that it is a very positive sign and a fact we 
can only applaud and welcome. However, given that 
the ECB has been operative for ﬁ  ve years now, we are 
nearing a point in time when the performance of the 
ECB with respect to its goal of price stability should 
be assessed by the ECON on a regular basis. 
Stability-oriented Monetary Policy Strategy and 
Communication
In the monetary dialogue, issues relating to the 
stability-oriented monetary policy strategy and com-
munication with regard to this policy strategy sur-
faced regularly.6 Attention was focused on two main 
features: 
5 S. Hämäläinen: The ECB’s Monetary Policy – Accountability, 
Transparency and Communication, speech, 14 September 2001.
6 For more on the ECB’s strategy see European Central Bank: The 
Monetary Policy of the ECB, Frankfurt 2004.
Subject Frequency1
The stability oriented monetary policy strategy  30
The secondary objective as described in Article 105 
of the Treaty 23
The deﬁ  nition of price stability as deﬁ  ned by the ECB 22
Publication of (inﬂ  ation) forecasts 7
Publication of the minutes of meetings of the 
Governing Council of the ECB 10
Improvement of published (inﬂ  ation) projections 10
Table 1
Subjects Mentioned by the Panel of Experts
1 Frequency relates to the number of papers in which these subjects 
have been mentioned.
Criterion Frequency
Primary and secondary objective, including the 
deﬁ  nition of price stability 
 
66a





Accountability   2   
Economic reports  1
 
Table 2
Subjects from Monetary Dialogues
a Including calls for a lower interest rate. These calls have been includ-
ed because their high frequency signals to the ECB that the ECON 
wants the central bank to redeﬁ  ne its deﬁ  nition of price stability so 
that it can do more with regard to its secondary goal. 
b Including calls on the ECB to publish its forecasts as well as calls to 
improve them after the ECB decided to publish them.Intereconomics, July/August 2004
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• the publication of minutes and votes of the meet-
ings of the Governing Council of the ECB
• the two pillars of the aforementioned strategy, es-
pecially the relevance of the ﬁ  rst pillar. 
The binding element is the notion that the public 
and the ﬁ  nancial markets have encountered certain 
difﬁ   culties in understanding the ECB. This unclear 
communication in turn leads to relatively high uncer-
tainty and lack of conﬁ  dence in the ECB with all its 
negative consequences, such as rendering its mon-
etary policy less effective. 
Minutes of the Meetings
Apart from the view held by the ECON that publish-
ing minutes fosters transparency and accountability 
it also has the beneﬁ  t of increasing the understand-
ing of the arguments presented. For a long time the 
ECB did not even publish the arguments for and 
against any of its decisions. As we shall see later on, 
only recently the ECB has started to publish all the 
arguments that have been put on the table during its 
meetings. The fact that even experts have trouble 
reading and understanding the ECB strengthens the 
ECON’s view with regard to this point. Finally, the 
publication of minutes in some form would make it 
possible to get an indication of likely policy actions 
in the future. Ever since the ECB took over the con-
duct of monetary policy in the euro area, there have 
been occasions that seem to justify the ECON’s case. 
Some of them have been mentioned both by the 
members of the ECON and by the panel of experts, 
such as the now famous interest rate decrease of 10 
May 2001. 
The panel of experts has a somewhat different 
view on this particular issue than the ECON. Although 
Eijfﬁ  nger7 argues that the transparency of monetary 
policy increases if the minutes of the meetings and/or 
the decisions including all arguments presented (in 
favour of and against) are published, he recognises 
that this way of communicating is unclear as the ECB 
does this by means of press conferences that follow 
immediately after the relevant meeting of the Govern-
ing Council. In his view the minutes should contain 
an analysis of the environment in the euro area, an 
estimation of the risks to price stability and a consist-
ent and logical explanation of decisions based on the 
ﬁ  rst two reasons given, but not the voting behaviour 
of the members of the Governing Council. Regarding 
calls for the publication of voting behaviour, some 
argue that this would in essence do more harm than 
good as it could be interpreted along national lines, 
although all members of the Governing Council share 
a collective responsibility.8 This, in turn, could result 
in pressure being put on individual members of the 
council. Because of this, Wyplosz argues, “as long 
as interpretation along national lines is likely to occur, 
minutes of the meetings should not be published”.9 
These views do not support calls from ECON to the 
ECB to publish minutes. However, there is also an-
other line of argument that goes as follows. The ECB 
is seen by some observers as lacking transparency 
and accountability. These shortcomings can only be 
solved via institutional reform, but these changes 
could and should be anticipated by some modest 
reform as proposed by Mazier.10 One of the changes 
Mazier proposed is the “full publication of internal 
debates and votes of the ECB and a much richer dia-
logue with the European Parliament”. Finally, it has 
been argued that by publishing minutes conspiracy 
theories, such as the suggestion that the ECB some-
times has deliberately delayed taking certain action 
in order to show that it is indeed independent and 
cannot be inﬂ  uenced, would vanish.11 
The ECB has repeatedly stressed that communica-
tion with the public is very important to the central 
bank. However, the publication of minutes has been 
put off on two grounds. First, as after every meeting 
of the Governing Council of the ECB when monetary 
policy is discussed its decisions and reasoning are 
published, it is not clear, as Duisenberg stated during 
the April 1999 monetary dialogue, “…that publish-
ing a discussion itself without even mentioning the 
names would add anything to what we already pub-
lish”. Giving a full account of the discussions would 
“create more confusion as in the discussion attitudes 
and opinions are adjustable” (monetary dialogue No-
vember 1999). Furthermore, the call for any publica-
tion of minutes including the voting pattern assumes 
that decisions are indeed taken by vote. According to 
Duisenberg however “it rarely occurs” that the Gov-
7 S. C. W . Eijffinger: Should the ECB Governing Council Decide to 
Publish its Minutes of Meetings?, Brieﬁ  ng paper for the Economic and 
Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, 2001.
8 See also O. Issing: The Eurosystem: Transparent and Accountable 
or “Willem in Euroland”, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 
37, No. 3, 1999, pp. 503-519.
9 C. Wyplosz: The ECB Communication Strategy, Brieﬁ  ng Paper 
for the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European 
Parliament, 2001.
10 J. Mazier: The Conduct of Monetary Policy and an Evaluation of 
the Economic Situation in Europe, Brieﬁ  ng Paper for the Economic 
and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, 2000. 
11 D. Gros: Improvement of the Democratic Accountability Process, 
Brieﬁ  ng Paper for the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of 
the European Parliament, 1999.ECB
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erning Council even takes a vote (monetary dialogue 
May 2001). 
Second, making public how individual members 
have voted (in cases where a decision was taken by 
vote) could expose them to pressure and make inter-
nal debate on monetary policy issues less free than it 
is at the moment. In this case, arguments presented 
by individual members would become well-prepared 
and carefully edited, written documents that every 
individual member would read out in the meeting, de 
facto “killing” discussion within the Governing Coun-
cil. The notion that the monetary policy strategy of 
the ECB is unclear is strongly rejected by the central 
bank with the argument that it is the only central bank 
that even has a strategy and goes out of its way to 
explain it. 
The Two-pillar Strategy
Views on the usefulness of the monetary pillar in 
the monetary strategy of the ECB are much more 
similar between ECON and the panel of experts than 
those on the previous issue. 
The two-pillar strategy, and the monetary pillar in 
particular, is attacked on two accounts:
• ﬁ  rst, it is said to be confusing and to mislead peo-
ple; 
• second, it is attacked on the prevailing view that the 
connection between money growth and inﬂ  ation is 
not so evident. 
The academic world has not been as kind to 
the ECB on this issue as it has been with regard to 
the publication of minutes. This pillar of the ECB’s 
monetary strategy has been criticised by almost 
everyone. In a paper by Begg et al.12 it was described 
as “ﬂ   awed beyond repair” and looking “extremely 
ridiculous, giving perverse signals that the ECB prob-
ably ignores”, a view widely shared by the panel of 
experts. 
The monetary pillar of the stability-oriented mon-
etary policy strategy is said to be confusing to the 
public as the growth rate of the M3 monetary ag-
gregate has regularly been higher than the reference 
value, but the ECB does not react to this (see Figure 
1). The ECON has suggested that it is also confusing 
because it looks as if the ECB follows one pillar only, 
while ofﬁ  cially there are two pillars. The argument is 
that it reacts to the danger of high inﬂ  ation but not 
necessarily to the overshooting of its reference value 
for monetary growth. Begg et al. show that the cor-
relation between the money growth indicator used by 
the ECB and its interest rates decisions is not even 
equal to zero but that it has the wrong sign, i.e. in 
times when monetary growth was higher than the ref-
erence value, the ECB actually lowered interest rates. 
Therefore, as the ECB reacts to an increase in ex-
pected inﬂ  ation but not to abundant money growth, it 
seems already to be acting as if it had one pillar only. 
To end the confusion regarding its strategy, it should 
ofﬁ  cially declare this. 
Another source of confusion is the strategy itself. 
The ECB is said to pretend that both pillars point in 
the same direction.13 It can therefore revert to either 
of the two pillars to justify interest rate changes.14 
While one of its predecessors, the Bundesbank, 
had enough credibility to regularly ignore the data 
on monetary growth, the ECB has not (yet). Ignor-
ing monetary growth or justifying it in an inconsistent 
way only increases confusion and uncertainty, ac-
cording to Mazier.15 Finally, potential conﬂ  ict between 
the two pillars exists as the one could point towards 
increasing inﬂ  ationary pressure, while the other could 
point in the other direction.16 As it is not clear what 
weights are given to the two pillars, this only adds 
13 D. Gros: The ECB’s Unsettling Opaqueness, Brieﬁ  ng paper for the 
Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parlia-
ment, 2001.
14 See also S. C. W. Eijffinger: Should the European Central Bank 
Use M3 to Assess Price Stability?, Brieﬁ  ng paper for the Economic 
and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, 2001.
15 J. Mazier: M3, Inﬂ  ation and the ECB, Brieﬁ  ng paper for the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, 
2001.
16 P . Bofinger: The Conduct of Monetary Policy by the European 
Central Bank According to Article 105 of the Treaty versus the Real 
Economy, Brieﬁ  ng paper for the Monetary Subcommittee of the Euro-
pean Parliament, 1999.
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to the confusion that already exists. In such a case 
nobody has even the faintest idea which pillar the 
ECB will allow to prevail. It is clear that this increases 
the degree of uncertainty already associated with 
the ECB by many observers. On another note, it is 
questionable whether the M3 is a good indicator at 
all.17 Svensson18 has suggested that experience from 
a majority of countries shows that shifts in the money 
demand function in the long run are not uncommon 
and therefore may occur again any time, although 
he admits that there is some evidence that the long-
run money demand for the euro area is stable. Even 
without these shifts, the existing correlation between 
money growth and inﬂ  ation is often misunderstood 
according to Svensson,19 because, as the two vari-
ables are endogenous variables, nothing can be said 
about the direction of causality. Even if the inclusion 
of a monetary target is allowed for, it is claimed that 
the ECB is using the wrong one, as it has been shown 
by Svensson20 that the real money gap is the target 
to use rather than the currently used nominal money-
growth indicator.21 
The ECB seems to have taken note of these re-
sults22 but does not appear to be acting on them.23 
Finally there has also been confusion about how to 
interpret the M3 growth ﬁ  gures.24 This confusion 
makes statistical corrections like the one on 10 May 
2001,25 no matter how justiﬁ  able they may be, nul-
lify the very reason why this pillar exists, namely its 
transparency.26 
Members of the panel of experts and of ECON are 
unanimous in presenting the solution: a combination 
of the ﬁ   rst and second pillar in one pillar only, de 
facto abolishing the money growth pillar. This would 
make monetary policy decisions less confusing and 
easier to explain and would therefore enhance the 
credibility of the ECB. A nominal anchor should not 
be monetary growth but ﬂ  exible  inﬂ  ation  forecast 
targeting.27 Monetary growth would then be reduced 
to  an indicator (as monetary growth does contain 
valuable information) instead of being the indicator. 
It is questionable whether it deserves such a promi-
nent role.28 Svensson rejects the argument that this 
change, or any change in the monetary policy strat-
egy of a central bank for that matter, would negatively 
affect credibility. On the contrary, it would, in his view, 
most likely improve it.29 
Finally, the monetary policy strategy of the ECB 
is still seen as a combination of monetary targeting 
and inﬂ   ation targeting. This is illustrated by views 
from both the ECON and the panel of experts. Bean30 
for example has described the second pillar as “not 
a million miles away from a formal inﬂ  ation target” 
while one of the members of the ECON, Mr. Katiforis, 
referred to it as “a lot of words for an inﬂ  ation target”. 
The ECB sticks to its line that the stability-oriented 
monetary policy strategy is “neither monetary nor 
inﬂ  ation targeting nor even a mixture of these two ap-
proaches well known to observers”.31 
25 The growth of M3 at the time was 4.8 %. During the press confer-
ence on 10 May 2001 the ECB announced that “there have been 
indications that the monetary growth ﬁ  gures are distorted upwards by 
non-euro area residents’ purchases of negotiable paper included in 
M3…As regards holdings of money market fund units/shares by non-
euro area residents…the distortion has become more sizable over re-
cent months and currently amounts to around half a percentage point. 
In addition, there have been non-negligible upward distortions to the 
annual growth of M3 as a result of non-euro area residents’ holdings 
of other marketable paper included in M3…Taking into account these 
upward distortions…it can now be concluded that there is no longer 
a risk to price stability over the medium term emanating from the ﬁ  rst 
pillar”. 
26 D. Gros: The ECB’s Unsettling Opaqueness, op. cit.
27 L. E. O. Svensson: What is Wrong with the Eurosystem’s Money-
growth Indicator ..., op. cit.
28 P . Bofinger, op. cit.
29 L. E. O. Svensson: What is Wrong with the Eurosystem’s Money-
growth Indicator ..., op. cit.
30 C. Bean: An Analysis of the ECB’s Monetary Policy Strategy and 
its Potential Contribution to Growth and Employment, Brieﬁ  ng paper 
for the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European 
Parliament, 1999.
31 O. Issing: The Monetary Policy of the ECB in a World of Uncer-
tainty, op. cit.
17 See for example G. de la Dehesa: Is M3 a Useful Tool to Assess 
Price Stability?, Brieﬁ  ng paper for the Economic and Monetary Affairs 
Committee of the European Parliament, 2001. However, some em-
pirical research shows that there is in fact a structural stability in the 
European money demand function for M1 and M3 (see for example V. 
Clausen and J. R. Kim: The Long-Run Stability of European Money 
Demand, in: Journal of Economic Integration, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2000, pp. 
486-505). 
18 L. E. O. Svensson: What is Wrong with the Eurosystem’s Money-
growth Indicator and What Should the Eurosystem do About it?, Brief-
ing paper for the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the 
European Parliament, 2000.
19 L. E. O. Svensson: A Reform of the Eurosystem’s Monetary Policy 
Strategy is Increasingly Urgent, Brieﬁ  ng paper for the Economic and 
Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, 2002.
20 L. E. O. Svensson: What is Wrong ..., op. cit.; L. E. O. Sven-
sson: A Reform of the Eurosystem’s ..., op. cit.
21 The real money gap is the difference between the current real money 
stock (nominal money stock deﬂ  ated by a commonly used inﬂ  ation 
measure such as CPI) and the real money stock that would result in a 
hypothetical long-run equilibrium, where y equals y* and V equals V* 
(velocity’s long-run level).
22 O. Issing: The Monetary Policy of the ECB in a World of Uncer-
tainty, speech, December 1999.
23 Then again there is Duisenberg’s refusal to answer a question on 
the money gap because, in his words, “I do not know precisely what a 
money gap is” (ECB press conference 3 March 2002)!
24 J. Mazier: M3, Inﬂ  ation and the ECB, op. cit.ECB
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Primary and Secondary Objective and the 
Deﬁ  nition of Price Stability
Even before the start of the analysis of the mone-
tary dialogues one expects the ECON, being a politi-
cal body, to show a special interest in the secondary 
objective of the ECB, because as Wyplosz32 stated, 
“price stability is highly desirable, but so is economic 
growth and full employment”. Therefore it is not sur-
prising that this issue was raised in every monetary 
dialogue, with an absolute peak on 12 September 
2001, the day after the terrorist attacks on New York. 
The ECB has from the beginning deﬁ  ned its pri-
mary objective but has failed, according to ECON, to 
do the same for its secondary objective. Chairperson 
Mrs. Randzio-Plath called the ECB’s deﬁ  nition  of 
its secondary objective “very vague” as far back as 
in April 1999. This view that the ECB has failed to 
provide a clear deﬁ  nition in turn is said to have di-
minished transparency and made it even harder for 
the markets and the public to read the ECB. Further-
more, the ECB is seen to be too hawkish on inﬂ  ation. 
The very deﬁ  nition of price stability is said to be too 
rigid, focussing too much on inﬂ  ation and making it 
virtually impossible for the central bank to pursue its 
secondary objective, certainly when compared with 
some other central banks (see for instance Table 3). 
This deﬁ  nition of price stability could hurt employ-
ment because a rise in output is likely to lead to inﬂ  a-
tion pressures, which in turn would mean that interest 
rates will rise, leading to lower output and eventu-
ally lower employment. The ECON has shown very 
clearly that it is unsatisﬁ  ed with the ECB’s deﬁ  nition. 
On occasion more rigorous threats have been uttered 
such as the one by Chairperson Mrs. Randzio-Plath, 
when she wondered “whether we (the ECON) should 
redeﬁ  ne your (ECB’s) concept of price stability”. The 
number of times the ECON mentioned this possibil-
ity surged during 2003.33 For example, during the 
monetary dialogue on 17 February 2003 the following 
exchange between Mrs. Randzio-Plath and President 
Duisenberg took place:
Randzio-Plath: “The fact is that – as has already 
been said – no other central bank imposes such a 
rigid deﬁ  nition … This makes me very keen to put to 
you the related question … whether it might be better 
to leave such a deﬁ  nition to others, as is certainly the 
case in other countries”.
Duisenberg: “… I am, of course, very happy with 
the fact that the Treaty gave us the mandate to try to 
maintain price stability, but that the deﬁ  nition of what 
price stability is was left to the ECB itself. I hope that 
future versions of the Treaty will maintain that.”
The ECB rejects the criticism that it has not de-
ﬁ  ned its secondary objective, pointing to its regular 
statements that the best monetary policy can do to 
support growth and employment is to achieve and 
maintain price stability. Some members of the panel 
of experts reject this deﬁ  nition, on the grounds that 
monetary policy does have an effect on real variables 
in the short term, of which fact the Fed is a good 
example.34 In practice it is found that the ECB is not 
overly concerned by the fact that it has missed its tar-
get in its ﬁ  rst years of existence.35 It also appears to 
accommodate temporary shocks, as can be derived 
from the fact that interest rates do not differ from the 
levels that would result if the Taylor rule36 were used, 
meaning in fact that its monetary policy in practice 
is much more in line with the Maastricht Treaty than 
what would be expected from its conceptual frame-
work.37 It is not hard to see that this, although it might 
be welcomed, negatively affects the credibility of the 
ECB as it in fact means that the ECB’s deeds do not 
match its words. 
34 See, among others, G. A. Horn: An Analysis of the ECB’s Monetary 
Strategy and its Contribution to Growth and Employment, Brieﬁ  ng 
paper for the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the Euro-
pean Parliament, 2001; D. Gros: An Analysis of the ECB’s Monetary 
Strategy and its Contribution to Growth and Employment, Brieﬁ  ng 
paper for the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the Euro-
pean Parliament, 1999; P. Bofinger, op. cit. 
35 C. Wyplosz: Brieﬁ  ng paper for the Economic and Monetary Affairs 
Committee of the European Parliament, 1st quarter, 2001.
36 According to the Taylor rule, the nominal interest rate should be set 
using the equilibrium real interest rate, the rate of inﬂ  ation over the pre-
vious year, the inﬂ  ation objective and the output gap. The rule is given 
by the equation it = req  + t + 0.5 [yt  + (t + *)] (see also J. B. Taylor: 
Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice, in: Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy, No. 39, 1993, pp. 195-214).
37 P . Bofinger, op. cit.
Central Bank Target
Bank of England 2 % (with a symmetric band of 1 % 
on both sides)
Reserve Bank of Australia 2 – 3 %
Reserve Bank of New Zealand 1 – 3 %
Bank of Canada 1 – 3 %
Federal Reserve System 1 – 3 % (generally assumed)
32 C. Wyplosz: Brieﬁ  ng paper for the Economic and Monetary Affairs 
Committee of the European Parliament, 3rd quarter, 2000.
33 During the monetary dialogue in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2003 the mem-
bers of the ECON mentioned the possibility that the politicians could 
change the ECB Statute four times (and once in the third quarter 
monetary dialogue).
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The ECON has called for the publication of fore-
casts because it would help in understanding the 
monetary policy of the ECB properly and because 
it would give a clearer picture of the strategy and 
the horizon of monetary policy. As Bean describes 
it, the problem with the ECB is that it does not re-
veal in a transparent manner how all the various 
indicators that it looks at are implicitly aggregated 
together in reaching a ﬁ  nal decision.38 This creates 
confusion, as was illustrated during the September 
2001 monetary dialogue, in which Mr. Abitbol, one of 
the ECON members, raised concerns as “one cannot 
understand that for two and a half years all the bank’s 
forecasts have been wrong and you can still tell us … 
that these projections are going to be ﬁ  ne”. 
For some time, the ECB refused to publish fore-
casts with a number of arguments, the main one of 
which has been that publishing an inﬂ  ation forecast 
would send the message that a complex, thorough 
and comprehensive analysis of various indicators 
carried out by the Governing Council can be sum-
marised in a single number. Furthermore, the ECB 
was concerned that the general public might misin-
terpret this ﬁ  gure and see it as the target, expecting 
the ECB to react accordingly, which in turn would not 
be consistent with the ECB’s principle of clarity as, 
eventually, it would “obscure rather than clarify what 
the Governing Council is actually doing”.39 
Changes at the ECB and the Analysis
We have used the ECB’s press releases and tran-
scripts of press conferences to ﬁ  nd out what changes 
with regard to communication and transparency the 
ECB had implemented in previous years. In chrono-
logical order they include the following.
•  Further enhancement of the transparency policy. 
On 13 April 1999 the Governing Council announced 
that “with a view to further enhancing the ECB’s 
transparency policy, the Governing Council has 
today decided to publish all non-conﬁ  dential legal 
instruments governing the relationship between the 
ECB and the euro area national central banks in the 
Ofﬁ   cial Journal of the European Communities … 
The members of the Governing Council regard the 
transparency of the decision-making process as 
an appropriate means by which to strengthen the 
democratic nature of the institution and to increase 
the public’s conﬁ  dence in its administration”.40
• Changes regarding communication strategy. Up to 
15 July 1999 the ECB had somewhat modiﬁ  ed its 
communication strategy, reacting to the criticism 
that the message conveyed by members of the 
Governing Council could be and has been inter-
preted in various ways, making it difﬁ  cult to read 
the central bank. As a reaction the ECB increasingly 
started speaking with one voice, trying as well as 
possible to communicate one message, even if 
through many mouths, despite the obvious linguis-
tic problems for example. Furthermore it agreed, 
and communicated this very strongly, that when 
changes in monetary policy were apparent the mar-
kets should listen only to the President. Moreover 
the ECB, according to the President and the Vice-
president, “changed the tone of the assessment 
and its presentation” starting from 15 July 1999.41 
• Publication of staff economic projections. In June 
2000 the ECB announced that, starting from De-
cember 2000, it would publish its staff economic 
projections for, among other things, real GDP 
growth and HICP (Harmonised Index of Consumer 
Prices).42
• Decision to assess monetary policy once a month 
instead of twice a month. In November 2001 the 
Governing Council of the ECB decided effectively 
to halve the number of meetings in which it assess-
es monetary policy. This decision was induced by 
the impression in the Council that the relatively high 
frequency (compared to the Fed for example) am-
pliﬁ  ed speculation in the markets and led to higher 
volatility in interest rates and exchange rates. 
• Change in communication. In its statement follow-
ing the monetary policy meeting on 7 November 
2002 the ECB stated that it had discussed the ar-
guments for and against cutting or raising interest 
rates. This is something the ECB had not done until 
then. During the press conference after the meeting 
of the Governing Council on 7 November 2002 the 
President of the ECB went on record that this was a 
change in the way the ECB communicates. He did 
not want to classify it as a permanent change, but a 
change nonetheless. 
• Evaluation of the strategy. On 5 December 2002 
the ECB President stated, “We are aware of the 
comments made here and there and now and then 
41 European Central Bank: Press Conference, 15 July 1999.
42 European Central Bank: Press Release, 8 June 2000.
38 C. Bean, op. cit.
39 W . F . Duisenberg: The ESCB’s Stability-oriented Monetary Policy 
Strategy, speech, November 1998.
40 European Central Bank: Press Conference, 13 April 1999.ECB
Intereconomics, July/August 2004 198
about our two-pillar strategy. We have decided, in 
the course of next year, to come up with a serious 
evaluation, not necessarily a change, because we 
are still happy with our strategy. But we will make a 
serious assessment and evaluation of the monetary 
strategy … ”43
• Deﬁ  nition of price stability. Based on the strategy 
evaluation, the ECB on 8 May 2003 changed the 
deﬁ  nition of price stability from “a year-on-year in-
crease in Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices for 
the euro area of below 2%” to “below, but close to 
2%”. 
• Change regarding the two pillars. The ECB decided 
that, from 8 May 2003 onwards, it would present 
its analysis in two parts: the economic analysis and 
the monetary analysis. With regard to the monetary 
analysis (previously the ﬁ   rst pillar) the ECB an-
nounced it would no longer focus only on M3 but 
on  “a wide range of monetary indicators includ-
ing M3, its components and counterparts, notably 
credit, and various measures of excess liquidity”. 
Furthermore, the bank decided to “no longer con-
duct a review of the reference value on an annual 
basis”.44  
We shall assess these changes against the back-
ground of changes the ECON requested. Some of 
the requested changes were outlined in the Euro-
pean Parliament’s resolution on the annual report for 
1998 of the European Central bank, adopted on 27 
October 1999 and based on the report of the ECON 
(Report A5-0035/1999). In this report the Committee 
called on the ECB to:
1.   publish a summary of minutes taken at the meetings 
 of the ECB Governing Council; 
2.   publish macro-economic forecasts on a six-monthly 
 basis; 
3.   publish a regular overall report of economic de  
 velopments in each of the participating euro area 
 countries;
4.   make publicly available on an annual basis econo
 metric models of the euro area economy and the 
 global economy used at the ECB; 
5.   make clear how monetary policy is intended, as 
 long as the objective of price stability is maintained, 
 to contribute to a balanced and appropriate policy 
 mix, with a view to promoting sustainable growth 
 and employment.
In addition, two other criteria will be included 
based on the outcomes of the analysis of the mon 
etary dialogues:
6.  abolish the ﬁ  rst pillar of the stability oriented mon      
 etary policy strategy and adopt inﬂ  ation targeting; 
7. relax the existing deﬁ  nition of price stability.
After relating changes that have been implemented 
by the ECB to the seven criteria above, we derive two 
seemingly contradictory conclusions. First, the ECB 
has changed the status quo with regard to ﬁ  ve out of 
the seven criteria, namely criteria 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7. On 
the other hand, the second conclusion that we can 
derive from our analysis is that with regard to criteria 
2, 5, 6 and 7 the ECB has not met the requirements 
in full, i.e. the changes were not implemented in the 
manner the ECON would have liked to see. This is an 
interesting point to observe. One explanation could 
be that the ECB intentionally did this in order to avoid 
the impression that its independence is endangered, 
i.e. that it gives in to the calls of some political body. 
The ﬁ  rst conclusion is based on the fact that the 
ECB has published its economic projections (crite-
rion 2) and econometric models (criterion 4), it has 
stated that the best contribution monetary policy can 
make to a balanced and appropriate policy mix, with 
a view to promoting sustainable growth and employ-
ment, is to achieve and maintain price stability in the 
euro area (criterion 5), it has discarded the reference 
value of the growth of M3 money supply aggregate 
(criterion 6) and it has changed the deﬁ  nition of price 
stability from “below 2%” to “below, but close to 2%” 
as we have seen above.
After our examination of criteria 2, 5, 6 and 7 in 
more detail we shall derive the second conclusion.45 
Publication of staff economic projections has 
come under severe criticism from the panel of ex-
perts and the ECON.46 Although it met the strongly 
and consistently expressed wish of the ECON by 
publishing projections for all requested variables, 
from the very beginning the ECB made it clear that 
these projections should not be confused with fore-
casts. It devalued its projections at the same time 
as these were published for the ﬁ  rst time by stating 
45 The fourth criterion is left out as no criticism (or appraisal for that 
matter) was found speciﬁ  cally concerning econometric models. This 
might be the consequence of their detailed and rather technical na-
ture. 
46 See for example L. E. O. Svensson: What is Good and What is 
Bad With the Eurosystem’s Published Forecasts and How Can They 
be Improved?, Brieﬁ  ng paper for the Economic and Monetary Affairs 
Committee of the European Parliament, 2001.
43 European Central Bank: Press conference, 5 December 2002.
44 European Central Bank: Press Release, 8 May 2003.Intereconomics, July/August 2004
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that they “do not cover all the information pertaining 
to the second pillar and do not take into account the 
information relating to the analysis under the ﬁ  rst pil-
lar of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy. From this 
perspective, the staff projections play a useful but 
limited role in the strategy”.47 
With regard to the ﬁ  fth criterion, ECON would have 
wanted to hear from the ECB how it sees its second-
ary objective as described in Article 105 of the Maas-
tricht Treaty, involving some deﬁ  nition as in the case 
of the primary objective. The ECB has responded to 
this on numerous occasions by stating that the best 
way monetary policy can contribute to the goals de-
scribed in Article 105 is to achieve and maintain price 
stability. It should be noted that strict interpretation of 
this statement means that, by achieving the primary 
objective, the ECB simultaneously also achieves its 
secondary objective. This in turn means that its sec-
ondary objective is in fact not a separate objective 
but rather only a derivative from the primary one. 
The ECB itself cannot be praised for having been 
very consistent with its remarks on this subject, 
adding to uncertainty that already existed. During 
the monetary dialogue on 18 January 1999 Presi-
dent Duisenberg stated that once price stability is 
achieved, one should not “change track and focus 
on other things, in the interest of economic policy in 
general. Our aim is not only to have price stability but 
also to maintain it.” Just a couple of months later, in 
April 1999 the ECB lowered its key interest rate by 50 
base points, after the analysis showed that the major 
risk at that time was that the expectations regarding 
real economic developments were for a downturn.   
According to Duisenberg this made it possible for the 
ECB to “pay due attention to the secondary objective 
of monetary policy of the ECB”. 
We would like once again to point to the fact that 
the ECB’s interest rates have behaved as if the Taylor 
rule were being practised. This means that either the 
ECB is right and its actions geared towards achieving 
price stability do indeed simultaneously achieve its 
secondary objective or the ECB is informally looking 
at the size of the output gap48 and setting its interest 
rates accordingly. If the ﬁ  rst explanation is the right 
one, there are no consequences and the ECB should 
hold to its practice. However, if the second is true, 
the credibility of the ECB will be seriously damaged 
and a strong case could be made for more transpar-
ency, including publication of minutes of meetings, 
despite the already stated disadvantages.
In relation to criterion 6 (abolishment of the ﬁ  rst 
pillar and adoption of inﬂ  ation targeting) the ECB did 
revaluate the ﬁ  rst pillar but it has not moved to inﬂ  a-
tion targeting. 
Finally, regarding the seventh criterion, the ECON’s 
goal was to widen the inﬂ  ation band because of its 
supposed rigidity and in order to create more room 
for the ECB to act in line with its second goal, promo-
tion of economic growth. As we shall argue later on, 
the ECB, by changing the deﬁ  nition of price stability, 
has effectively made it possible and very likely that 
the central bank will act more often to support eco-
nomic growth. From the monetary dialogues, how-
ever, it emerges clearly that the ECON would have 
liked to see the ECB widen the band within which 
inﬂ  ation is permitted to ﬂ  uctuate from a 2% ceiling 
now to as high as 2.5% or 3%, something the ECB 
has not done. 
We have mentioned and discussed all the criteria 
above with the exception of criterion 3 (publication 
of a regular overall report of economic developments 
in each of the participating euro area countries or, as 
it has been referred to, the European version of the 
beige book). On this one we can be brief. Former 
President Duisenberg, during the monetary dialogue 
in November 2000, stated very clearly that “the ECB 
is not a forecasting agency but a central bank … we 
take a look at the euro area, not at individual coun-
tries”.
In Table 4 we have given a total overview of the 
monetary dialogue “transmission mechanism”. In 
the third column, the ECB’s reply is given as one of 
the following entries: “yes”, “no” and “unknown”. 
The criterion as to what to enter each time was the 
reply given by the ECB in the question-and-answer 
sessions of the monetary dialogue after the ﬁ  rst time 
the ECON mentioned each subject (we indicate this 
as the immediate response). This method allows us 
to monitor and detect changes at the ECB, as we can 
compare the ﬁ  nal answer (change implemented) with 
the initial position. The third option was introduced to 
cope with the fact that often the reply cannot be clas-
siﬁ  ed a “yes” or a “no”. For each of the subjects the 
entries are based on the following elements.
• The ECB views inﬂ   ation as a monetary phenom-
enon and it has stated on numerous occasions that 
it has no intention of abolishing its ﬁ  rst pillar. There-
fore, for this subject a “no” has been entered. 
47 European Central Bank: Monthly Bulletin December, 2000.
48 The output gap is the difference between the actual output growth 
and potential output growth.ECB
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• As for the secondary objective, the entry is based 
on the comment by the President of the ECB made 
during the 18 January 1999 monetary dialogue that 
the ECB should not change track and stimulate the 
economy once it had achieved price stability. 
• With regard to the forecasts, the entry is based on 
a publication by the European Monetary Institute,49 
wherein inﬂ   ation forecasts are rejected because 
of the difﬁ  culties in producing them, their adverse 
effects on ﬁ   nancial markets and wage and price 
setting and of their possible harming effects for the 
ECB’s credibility. 
• In the case of the publication of econometric mod-
els, the entry “unknown” has been used because 
this subject was not mentioned during any of the 
monetary dialogues up to October 1999, when the 
resolution A5-0035/1999 was adopted.50 
•  Finally, a “no” in the case of country reports is 
the interpretation of the comment made by the 
President during the November 2000 monetary 
dialogue.
In the fourth column a “+” sign was entered if the 
ECB had changed its arrangements and procedures 
with regard to each subject up to December 2003 
(we indicate this as the delayed response). A “-” 
sign represents the no-change situation. These signs 
were given according to the results of the analysis 
described above. 
From the fourth column it follows that the ECB has 
met 71% of the wishes of the ECON. To calculate this 
we have divided the number of “+” signs from the 
fourth column by the number of subjects raised by 
ECON, as reported in the second  column. Using the 
same procedure we have calculated the same ratio 
for the panel of experts. We divided the number of 
“+” signs from the fourth column by the number of 
subjects in the ﬁ  rst column. This procedure yields a 
success rate of 80%. 
Given the fact that every subject that has been 
mentioned by the panel is also mentioned by ECON, 
this strongly indicates that the transmission from 
the panel of experts to ECON is equal to 100 %. 
In addition, and supporting this strong correlation, 
during monetary dialogues members of ECON have 
regularly referred directly to the brieﬁ  ng papers of the 
members of the panel of experts. From this we con-
clude that the panel’s contribution to the monetary 
dialogue is very important. It might even be stated 
that without it the ECON would most certainly be 
much less effective.
Predicting Changes
The monetary dialogue seems to be a good pre-
dictor of future changes at the ECB. This can be 
illustrated with the example of publication of the 
forecasts. In 1998, Duisenberg commented that 
forecasts would “obscure rather than clarify what the 
Governing Council is actually doing”. In April 1999, 
during that quarter’s monetary dialogue, he made a 
comment that, “There will also come a moment – it 
is too early but I personally have no doubt that there 
will come a moment – when we also like many other 
institutions will publish our forecasts … but in such a 
way that they will never become self-fulﬁ  lling prophe-
cies.” This was the ﬁ  rst indication that some changes 
regarding this issue could be expected in the future. 
Again, some six months later, in October 1999, in his 
presentation of the ECB’s Annual Report before the 
European Parliament, Duisenberg remarked that the 
forecasts would be made public in the course of the 
following year. In November 2000, before ECON, he 
ﬁ  nally announced that the ECB has decided to pub-
49 European Monetary Institute: The Single Monetary Policy in Stage 
Three: Speciﬁ  cation of the operational framework, 1997.
50 As an alternative, one could view this subject as a precondition for 
forecasts (the ﬁ  fth subject) as those must be based on some econo-
metric model. Thus, if we see the ﬁ  fth and the sixth subject as com-
plementary we would be inclined to replace “unknown” with “no” in 
this case. Applying this procedure, however, does not affect the ﬁ  nal 
outcome of the analysis, as in this particular case “unknown” is de 
facto treated as a “no”.
Subjects panel of experts1 Subjects ECON2 ECB reply Change
Monetary policy strategy3 Monetary policy 
strategy
no   +
The secondary objective The secondary 
objective
no   +
Deﬁ  nition of price stability Deﬁ  nition of price 
stability
no   +
Minutes of meetings Minutes of meetings no   -
Forecasts Forecasts no   +
Econometric models unknown   +
Report of economic 
development for 
each euro area 
country
no   -
Table 4
Subjects Raised and the ECB’s Reaction
1 These subjects have been taken from Table 1, the only change being 
that the last two subjects that were mentioned separately in Table 1 
are aggregated here under one heading (forecasts).  
2 Subjects appearing in this column are the criteria mentioned earlier. 
3 This subject concerns mainly (but not exclusively) the critique of the 
ﬁ  rst pillar of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy.Intereconomics, July/August 2004
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lish what it calls “economic projections for the euro 
area”.51 
Another example concerns the deﬁ  nition of price 
stability. In the monetary dialogue of June 2000, Du-
isenberg stated that changing the deﬁ  nition  would 
be “a disaster” because it could signal that the ECB 
no longer cared about inﬂ  ation and that this issue is 
“something that I categorically am inclined to with-
stand and to deny and I will not cooperate in this 
aspect”. Just a couple of months later, during the 
September 2000 monetary dialogue, he seemed to 
have started paving the way for possible change as 
he indicated that change is possible, saying that, “if 
the deﬁ  nition were to be changed it will be discussed 
fully in public and in no way would that infringe on 
the central bank independence, because ultimately it 
would still be the General Council of the ECB which 
takes the decision … However, it would be too early 
to change it now”.52
As we have seen, one of the outcomes of the 
evaluation of the monetary strategy has been that 
the deﬁ  nition of price stability has been relaxed. The 
ECB announced that it would, from that moment on, 
aim to maintain inﬂ  ation rates below, but close to 2%. 
This is a very signiﬁ  cant change as it effectively nar-
rows the corridor within which inﬂ  ation may ﬂ  uctuate 
without triggering the ECB into action. Under the pre-
vious deﬁ  nition (inﬂ  ation below 2%) the ECB would 
not necessarily act if inﬂ  ation were to fall to say 1.5%. 
Under the new deﬁ  nition however, 1.5% will induce 
the ECB to act, as the inﬂ  ation rate clearly is below, 
but not close to 2%. This boils down to cutting short-
term interest rates in order to drive inﬂ  ation towards 
2%. In the process, a lower short-term interest rate 
would give a boost to the economy, exactly what the 
ECON would request. So, in other words, the new 
deﬁ  nition of price stability enables the ECB to lower 
its interest rate more often than it would have done 
under the old deﬁ  nition in order to stimulate econom-
ic activity and put inﬂ  ation just below 2%. 
There are indications that, in the near future, the 
ECB might decide to publish the minutes of the 
meetings of its Governing Council. While in Novem-
ber 2000 Duisenberg strongly rejected any change 
with regard to the publication of minutes by saying 
that, “We (the ECB) do not intend to meet that wish 
(publication of minutes) of the European Parliament”, 
during the May 2002 monetary dialogue, when on 
one occasion the working of the Governing Council 
after the future enlargement of the euro area was 
discussed and the publication of minutes was again 
mentioned, he did not exclude the possibility that, as 
the Governing Council would become even larger, 
voting would occur and become normal procedure 
and that “as a consequence, also … the so-called 
anonymous balance of votes might be published”. 
The possibility that minutes would be published 
increased even further when Lucas Papademos, the 
Vice-president of the ECB, remarked that the change 
of view in the Governing Council “could be reﬂ  ected 
in the publication of anonymous votes. This could 
provide an additional signal to the markets about 
prospects of changes in the monetary policy” and 
“personally I would not feel that I would lose my inde-
pendence if votes were to be announced in a group 
sense”,53 which in essence goes fully against one of 
the ECB’s main arguments against publishing min-
utes and/or balance of votes. More importantly, this 
comment shows that the members of the Governing 
Council do not all seem to have the same opinion on 
this subject. 
Recommendations
The frequency of the ECB’s appearances before 
the European Parliament exceeds the average of 
appearances by other central banks before their par-
liaments.54 Based among other things on this ﬁ  nding 
and in relation to how the ECON could improve the 
monetary dialogues, we think it is obvious that there 
is no need for more, but rather better hearings.55 
First, we would recommend to the ECON to de-
mand that the ECB sticks to its Statute and takes 
a formal vote each time it meets, even if during its 
meetings it becomes clear that consensus can be 
reached (in this situation the consensus could simply 
be replaced by the outcome of 18 votes for and none 
against). In this case, the argument that voting be-
haviour cannot be revealed as voting had not taken 
53 European Parliament: Hearing of the Candidate for the Vice-Presi-
dency of the ECB, 22 April 22, 2002.
54 J. Lepper, G. Sterne: Parliamentary Scrutiny of Central Banks in 
the United Kingdom and Overseas, in: Bank of England Quarterly Bul-
letin, Autumn 2002, pp. 274-284.
55 Regarding this part we have beneﬁ  ted a lot from suggestions by 
Charles Wyplosz (see C. Wyplosz: Monetary Dialogue of 12 Sep-
tember 2001, 2001). 
51 The ECON welcomed this, but also issued a warning. Chairperson 
Mrs. Randzio-Plath called the publication of economic projections “a 
ﬁ  rst step towards greater transparency” and warned the ECB that 
they will ﬁ  rst look at the publication and determine how satisfactory 
the projections are and that they “will have to be reﬁ  ned and improved 
over the coming year so that they become economic forecasts in the 
true sense of the word” (European Parliament: Publication of Eco-
nomic Projections by ECB a First Step Toward Greater Transparency, 
Press Release, 21 December 2000).
52 Note the discrepancy, as the evaluation has been a fully internal 
process. No public discussion has taken place.ECB
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place would no longer be applicable, making it possi-
ble to build an even stronger case for the publication 
of minutes. 
Second, regarding the issue of restructuring 
the ECB’s General Council, the ECON should get 
more involved and insist on setting up some sort 
of monetary policy committee. The reason is that 
the individual members of the Governing Council in 
that case would not share collective responsibility. 
This would also make it possible to build a stronger 
case for the publication of minutes.56 It is a fact that 
one of the main reasons for ECON wanting minutes 
of the meetings is to be able to say something about 
the direction of monetary policy actions and that this 
wish is shared by the general public (as illustrated in 
press conferences). To avoid the negative side ef-
fects, the ECON should request from the ECB (and 
we advice the ECB to implement this change) that it 
indicate, after every meeting at which it assesses the 
stance of monetary policy, whether it has a neutral, 
tightening or relaxing bias, similar to what the Fed 
has been practising for some time. This would avoid 
the negative consequences of publishing minutes 
and increase the transparency and credibility of the 
monetary authority, while effectively extracting the 
same information. 
Third, the ECON should be more forceful during 
the dialogues, for example when the ECB repeats 
its mantras for the umpteenth time. For example, 
when the ECB mentions “medium term”, it should 
be pressed to deﬁ   ne what this term means as far 
as the ECB is concerned. This would tremendously 
improve the bank’s transparency and make it easier 
for the ECON to hold the ECB accountable.57 A good 
example is the subject of ECB inﬂ  ation projections. 
Instead of being content with the President’s remarks 
when he for example refers to “last available infor-
mation” or states that the inﬂ  ation could be higher 
or lower than expected, the ECON should hold onto 
this subject. This could be done by a number of fol-
low-up questions demanding that the ECB disclose 
the last information the Governing Council used in its 
meeting, whether the members agreed with the staff 
projections and if not, why not and so on. So far, we 
have not been able to detect this practice during the 
monetary dialogues with the ECB.
Fourth, a dialogue does not have the same mean-
ing as reporting. The ECON could change the title 
from Monetary Dialogue to Accountability Hearings. 
This would most likely improve the image of the hear-
ings, which would arguably be a small, but neverthe-
less not insigniﬁ  cant change.
Fifth, the ECB holds, after every ﬁ  rst meeting of the 
month, a press conference. The ECON should insist 
that the information given in these press conferences 
be made public in the Parliament, i.e. it should insist 
that the ECB scraps these press conferences and 
make them part of the Accountability Hearings. 
Sixth, the members of the ECON should refrain 
from asking questions on “local themes”, i.e. coun-
try-speciﬁ   c issues. Apart from giving the ECB an 
excellent chance to state the obvious, namely that 
it focuses on euro area-wide developments, it also 
creates the impression that the ECON does not know 
what the ECB’s task is and what the bank can and 
cannot do. To upgrade the hearings, the ECON must 
start by becoming more professional than it is now. 
Seventh, while asking questions, the members 
should include possible alternatives and make the 
President of the ECB explain why the alternatives 
they suggested are unsuitable for the ECB, instead of 
the current practice of not asking follow-up questions 
(this would of course mean that some procedural 
changes would be needed regarding these hearings). 
Finally, comparing the President’s remarks over 
time, we have noticed that he often contradicts him-
self. This gives the ECON a rather nice opportunity to 
confront him with this and demand a more thorough 
explanation. 
Concluding Remarks 
Analysis of the ECB’s press releases and press 
conferences led us to conclude that some changes 
were implemented. When we related the changes to 
the changes requested by the ECON we concluded 
that the ECB has met ﬁ  ve out of seven speciﬁ  cally 
deﬁ  ned wishes expressed by ECON. We have found 
that in 71% of the cases the ECB has implemented 
changes the ECON requested. In addition, two other 
facts have been noted. First, the ECB did not always 
fully comply with the structure or form asked for by 
the ECON. The ECB could have acted as it did in 
order to avoid giving the impression that others can 
inﬂ  uence it, even though the central bank might share 
the view of the ECON regarding some requested 
change and is of the opinion that it should comply in 
full. The other possibility is that the ECB is convinced 
that there are beneﬁ   ts to be gained from certain 
56 This interesting point is mentioned in S. Hämäläinen, op. cit.
57 Unless Milton Friedman was right when he remarked that “from re-
vealed preference, I suspect that by far and away two most important 
variables in their (central bankers) loss function are avoiding account-
ability on the one hand and achieving public prestige on the other” 
(quoted in I. J. M. Arnold: Empirical Essays in Monetary Economics, 
dissertation Erasmus University Rotterdam, 1995). Intereconomics, July/August 2004
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changes, but that it has valid arguments to disagree 
with the ECON on how far changes should go. 
For example, if we look at the publication of the 
inﬂ  ation forecasts, it is clear that the ECB has not met 
the wish of the ECON in full. Either the ECB did this 
on purpose to underline once again that it is inde-
pendent and cannot be forced into anything (the ﬁ  rst 
option from above) or the central bank is fully con-
vinced that publishing inﬂ  ation forecasts on behalf of 
its Governing Council would be disadvantageous (the 
second option from above). The only way to exclude 
one of these possibilities would be to take a look at 
the minutes of the meetings of the Governing Coun-
cil, as explicit statements or clues might be found 
there. Not having access to these (yet?) prevents the 
exclusion of either possibility at present.  
Second we note that the monetary dialogue can 
be used to successfully predict changes. The ECB 
seems to provide indications on changes that are 
to come, as for example in the case of the publica-
tion of forecasts and the redeﬁ  nition of price stabil-
ity. Extrapolating from this ﬁ   nding and assuming 
that the ECB’s behaviour in this aspect will remain 
unchanged, we will most probably witness more 
changes in the future. Based on the results from our 
analysis in this paper we expect to see the anony-
mous minutes of the ECB to be published in some 
form in the near future. As a matter of fact, by decid-
ing to provide the arguments made for and against 
a certain decision, the ECB has made a great step 
towards the publication of minutes. 
Based on this research we conclude that the ECB 
has shown a high degree of responsiveness to criti-
cism from the ECON. In other words there is some 
degree of inﬂ  uence running from Brussels to Frank-
furt. It is important to note that although we use the 
word “inﬂ  uence”, this should not be interpreted as 
meaning that the ECB has been put under formal 
pressure. However, we note that the ECON has taken 
the opportunity (in the form of discussions on the EU 
Constitution and the review of the Treaty of Maas-
tricht) to make clear to the ECB that its Statute could 
very well be changed in order to get the central bank 
to meet the remaining wishes of the ECON or to meet 
the partially met wishes in full.
We deﬁ  ne the ECON (and therefore the European 
Parliament) in a broad sense as being the body rep-
resenting the citizens of the euro area and assume 
that its preferences reﬂ  ect those of European voters, 
a valid assumption as the European Parliament is 
elected in a general election. Given that there is some 
evidence that, regarding the amount of pressure from 
other interest groups, the ECB is in a comfortable 
position,58 we conclude that the ECON is the most 
important factor that inﬂ  uences the ECB.
One could criticise this by arguing that the Euro-
pean Parliament, although democratically elected, 
does not have much political inﬂ  uence  compared, 
for example, to the ECOFIN Council. We think that 
the political inﬂ   uence of the European Parliament 
has increased in recent years, and certainly since the 
European Commission led by its former President 
Santer was forced to resign. Granted, the European 
Parliament does not have the inﬂ  uence or the role of 
the US Congress. However, regarding the issue of 
holding the ECB accountable, the ECON has shown 
itself to be a mature body. We might say that, owing 
to the fact that it has chosen a typical European ap-
proach to holding its central bank accountable and 
the fact that it goes to considerable length to prepare 
the monetary dialogues as thoroughly as possible, 
the role and inﬂ   uence of the European Parliament 
certainly has increased during past years. Nonethe-
less, there are various ways open for improvement. 
Based on this research we are convinced that the 
conclusion that the ECON inﬂ   uences the ECB to 
some degree does not mean that the bank is not as 
independent as its legal status implies. In this respect 
one thing should be pointed out: the ECB has shown 
a healthy attitude so far, indicating that it can deal 
with criticism and that it acknowledges the fact that 
it can learn from it. The evaluation of the ECB’s mon-
etary strategy is a good point to illustrate this. The 
central bank made it clear that it was happy with its 
strategy, but because there were strong signals that 
the public was not fully satisﬁ  ed, it nonetheless de-
cided to conduct an evaluation. This shows that the 
ECB pays attention to what the public thinks and that 
it acts on it, even when the ECB itself thinks that ac-
tion is not needed. This not only does not endanger 
its independence, it increases the credibility the ECB 
(or any central bank for that matter) needs.
We think that the importance of the European Par-
liament can increase even further as we have reached 
the “medium term” no matter how it is deﬁ  ned, allow-
ing the European Parliament to assess the perform-
ance of the ECB for the ﬁ  rst time. The price to pay for 
being independent is apparently, and quite rightfully 
we might add, the obligation to explain and give a full 
account of actions taken and their outcomes.
58 P . Maier: The Impact of Politics on Monetary Policy: A Study of the 
Bundesbank and Other Central Banks, Thesis, Rijksuniversiteit Gron-
ingen, 2001, Labyrint Publication.